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TARGETED KILLING AS ACTIVE SELF-DEFENSE*
Amos Guiorat
L Introduction
Since June 1967 Israel has implemented a wide variety of measures to
combat Palestinian terrorism in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Examples of such measures include the sealing and demolition of terrorist
homes, imposition of a curfew and other movement restricting measures,
administrative detention in those instances when criminal evidence was
unavailable or when the only basis of detention was security information
which could not be introduced in Court, deportation, and, recently, the
introduction of three new policies: assigned residence (as distinguished
from deportation), the erection of a security fence, and targeted killings.'
The focus of this paper will be a legal and policy examination of the
decision to implement targeted killings within the context of the right to
active self-defense as interpreted by the State of Israel. I should add that
while the majority of my comments refer to the legal arguments behind
targeted killing, I will also analyze its effectiveness as Professor Michael
Scharf has done in a Washington Post article2 and Professor Ed Kaplan of
Yale University has done in empirically based research challenging the
effectiveness of targeted killing.
Furthermore, an important question which will not be discussed deals
with the type of court in which terrorists should be tried. This is an issue
that we at Case are examining in a course I am teaching based in large part
on conversations I have had with Associate Dean Hiram Chodosh,
Professor Michael Scharf and Mr. Andrew McCarthy, from whom we shall
have the pleasure of hearing later.
* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center, on Friday, Oct. 8, 2004.
t Visiting Professor of Law and designated Professor of Law and Director of the Institute
for Global Security, Law and Policy at Case Western Reserve University School of Law
effective July 2005; served for nineteen years in the Israel Defense Forces, Judge Advocate
General Corps (Lt. Col.). The opinions expressed are the authors alone. Special thanks to
research assistant Niki Dorsky and colleagues Jon Leiken and Marc Stem for their
significant contributions to this work.
1 Benjamin A. Gorelick, The Israeli Response to Palestinian Breach of the Oslo
Agreements, 9 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 651 (2003).
2 Michael Scharf, In the Cross Hairs of a Scary Idea, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2004, at B 1.
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However, before we begin, a short historical survey is necessary to
help understand both the context and the significance of the present armed
conflict between the State of Israel and Palestinian terrorist organizations.
In addition, to appreciate the considerations involved in implementing
a policy of targeted killing, it is critical to understand the fundamental
difference between the armed conflict of the past four years and the nature
of the Palestinian opposition to the occupation from 1967 to 2000.
H. Historical Background
The years 1967-1987 were characterized by the Palestinian
population's general acceptance of the post 1967 Six-Day War occupation.
Such acceptance may have been based on fear or weariness after years of
living under Jordanian rule in the West Bank and under Egyptian rule in the
Gaza Strip. The overwhelming majority of the population was not engaged
in terror activity. The IDF responses to the terrorist attacks that did occur
included incarceration, deportation, and, in the Gaza Strip (in the late
1960's-early 1970's), undercover units which operatively engaged known
terrorists.
The Intifada (1987-1993), literally a "throwing-off' or "ridding,"
which was characterized by mass demonstrations, stone-throwing, and
Molotov cocktails, more closely resembled a civil uprising on the part of
the Palestinian population against the occupation than an organized
movement or response. It is important to note for purposes of historical
accuracy that the Intifada began in the Gaza Strip (December 1987) as a
spontaneous reaction to a car accident in which an Israeli truck driver
accidentally killed a number of Palestinians. The reaction clearly reflected
building frustration felt by Palestinians. Though the accident triggered the
incident, it was not an uprising that had been planned in advance.
Since 2000, over 1000 Israelis have been killed in over 20,000 terror
attacks that range from shootings to suicide bombers intent on killing the
maximum number of innocent civilians. Palestinian terror organizations
use weapons appropriate to armed conflict such as guns and missiles. This
should be compared to the Intifada, where the weapons of choice were
rocks, Molotov cocktails and knives.4 In addition, according to intelligence
reports based on seized Palestinian documents, the current armed conflict
3 Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law': A
Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killing, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233, 246
(2003).
4 See Brigadier General Uri Shoham, The Principle of Legality and the Israeli Military
Government in the Territories, 153 MiL L. REv. 245, 263 (1996).
5 Amnesty International, Israel and the Occupied Territories: State Assassinations and




was carefully planned in advance (this paper will not address Arafat's direct
or indirect role in the preparations but there is little doubt that such an
armed conflict could not have been so planned without his participation and
approval) and was not a spontaneous response either to the failed Camp
David talks or to Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount.
In light of the fact that Israel is under armed attack as evidenced by
both the nature and quantity of the attacks, its response has been
fundamentally different than its response to the Intifada. During the
Intifada, thousands of Palestinians were administratively detained, while
others were brought to trial or deported. The present conflict has been
characterized by a more aggressive operational response, required in large
part by the Palestinian terrorist groups' decisions to attack innocent
civilians with suicide bombers.
I1. Suicide Bombers
In order to understand this change in policy it is important to explain
the character of the suicide bomber infrastructure and how it has led to the
implementation of the targeted killing policy. A suicide bomb attack, an
attack which kills dozens of innocent civilians on their way to work,
relaxing at a coffee house or walking with their children, has been
described by Amnesty International as a "deliberate and systematic
targeting of civilians" and condemned by the organization as "a crime
against humanity." 5 The suicide bomber-he or she, father or mother-
who actually performs this "crime against humanity" has been described as
the "foot soldier" in a sophisticated and organized infrastructure.
The actual attack has been planned by terrorists who were responsible
for the recruiting of the actual bomber, the preparation of the bombs, the
identification of the target and the complicated logistics required to ensure
that the suicide bomber is actually transported from the West Bank or Gaza
Strip into Israel where the act will occur. Given the extraordinarily strict
security measures implemented by the IDF designed to prevent such
unlawful infiltration of terrorists into Israel, the logistical aspect of the
suicide bomber from an operational perspective is impressive.
It is crucial to comprehend that a successful suicide bombing is the
working of a well-orchestrated, difficult to penetrate, highly disciplined,
financially solvent terror organization and not an act of a lone individual.
This fact must be kept in mind when discussing and debating Israel's
counter-terrorism policy in the context of the right to self-defense.
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IV. What is Targeted Killing?
Targeted killing reflects a deliberate decision to order the death of a
Palestinian terrorist. It is important to emphasize that an individual will
only be targeted if he presents a serious threat to public order and safety
based on criminal evidence and/or reliable, corroborated intelligence
information clearly implicating him. Intelligence information is
corroborated when it is confirmed by at least two separate, unrelated
sources. There also must be no reasonable alternative to the targeted
killing, meaning that the international law requirement of seeking another
reasonable method of incapacitating the terrorist has proved fruitless.7
According to the Agreements signed with the Palestinians, the
Palestinian Authority and Israel are to be partners in fighting terrorism.
The practical significance of this obligation undertaken by the PA is that
they are supposed to arrest those who endanger the public order. Given that
the PA does not arrest Palestinian terrorists, the burden of arresting them
falls solely on the IDF.8 However, if arresting a Palestinian terrorist
unnecessarily endangers an IDF unit and there are no other operational
alternatives to keep the terrorist from carrying out his plan (about which the
IDF has sound and reliable corroborated intelligence information), a
decision may well be made to target both that particular terrorist and others,
as will be discussed, who are involved in the planning of suicide bombings.
According to international law, it is imperative that every effort be
made to ensure that collateral damage is limited to an absolute minimum.
This principal is incorporated into the IDF'S moral code and is taught to
soldiers in an interactive video my former unit developed in conjunction
with senior commanders.
According to the Jerusalem Post, the IDF has recently expanded the
scope of targeted killing to include the targeting of terrorists training for an
attack (recently an IAF helicopter attacked Hamas members in a field who
were involved in training).9
6 See Arieh O'Sullivan, IDF Kills two Key Hamas Terrorists, THE JERUSALEM POST, Nov.
1, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post File.
7 Robert F. Teplitz, Taking Assassination Attempts Seriously: Did the United States
Violate International Law in Forcefully Responding to the Iraqi Plot to Kill George Bush?,
28 Cornell Int'l L.J. 569, 610-613 (1995).
8 See Gorelick, supra note 1, at 667.
9 See Arieh O'Sullivan, The Army Redefines the 'Ticking Bomb', THE JERUSALEM POST,




The issue of self-defense and the breadth of its definition is under
extensive debate amongst international law experts and policy-makers. The
post 9/11 world has been confronted with this issue on a regular basis in
determining how best to combat terrorism under the umbrella of self-
defense.
In 1837, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated a definition
of self-defense that eventually evolved into customary international law.
Webster's definition followed what has come to be known as the Caroline
incident. The Caroline was a U.S. steamboat attempting to transport
supplies to Canadian insurgents. A British force interrupted the Caroline's
voyage, shot at it, set it on fire and let it wash over Niagara Falls. Webster
said that Britain's act did not qualify as self-defense because self-defense is
only justified "if the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."
According to Webster, Britain could have dealt with the Caroline in a more
diplomatic manner. He limited the right to self-defense to situations where
there is a real threat, the response is essential and proportional, and all
peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been exhausted. His idea is
now known as the Caroline doctrine, and was considered customary
international law until a competing defimition arose in Article 51 of the UN
Charter. °
Article 51 authorizes self-defense only if armed attack "occurs.""
This is a narrowing of the Caroline doctrine which provided for
anticipatory self-defense as long as the threat to national security is
reasonably believed to be imminent. 2 Article 51 's concept of pre-emption
has been significantly reduced from the Caroline doctrine. The
significance of this narrowing cannot be underestimated-from a customary
international law principle enabling pre-emption to a treaty-based definition
of self-defense dependent upon the occurrence of an armed attack.
International law was originally intended to apply to war and peace
between recognized States; the concept of non-State actors was not
contemplated. Thus, in studying responses to terrorism according to
international law, one of the issues that must be examined is the relevance
and applicability of international law to this "new form of warfare." Many
experts have called for a "new regime of international law" that specifically
'0 Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or Their
Commanders as an Act of Self-defense: Human Rights versus the State's Duty to Protect its
Citizens, 15 TEMPLE INT'L & COMP L.J. 195, 211 (2001).
11 U.N. Charter art. 51 available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
12 Davis Brown, Use of Force Against Terrorism After September llh: State
Responsibility, Self-Defense, and Other Responses, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 37
(2003).
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addresses circumstances unique to terrorism. Though international law as it
currently exists appears to be ill-equipped to deal with terrorism, the
concept of active self-defense could be a natural starting point for
developing this "new regime."
A thorough review of international law demonstrates that terrorism as
a subject of international law has only been considered in the past few
years. Clearly, the tragic events of 9/11 significantly contributed to this
development. The question that must be addressed given the narrowing of
the defmition of self-defense from the Caroline doctrine to the UN Charter
is: Does the right to active self-defense according to modern international
law allow States to effectively combat both State-sponsored and non-State-
sponsored terrorism?
Because the fight against terrorism takes place in what has been
referred to as the "back alleys and dark shadows against an unseen enemy,"
the State, in order to adequately defend itself, must be able to take the fight
to the terrorist before the terrorist takes the fight to it. From experience
gained over the years, it has become clear that the State must be able to act
preemptively in order to either deter terrorists or, at the very least, prevent
the terrorist act from taking place. By now, we have learned the price
society pays if it is unable to prevent terrorist acts. The question that must
be answered-both from a legal and policy perspective-is what tools
should be given to the State to combat terrorism? What I term active self-
defense would appear to be the most effective tool; that is, rather than wait
for the actual armed attack to "occur" (Article 51), the State must be able to
act anticipatorily (Caroline) against the non-State actor (not considered in
Caroline).
The development of a new body of international law providing legal
justification for such actions (active self defense against a non-State actor)
must be consistent with existing principles and obligations such as
proportionality, military necessity, collateral damage and exhaustion or
unavailability of peaceful alternatives. I am of the belief that the two
concepts-active self-defense and the four fundamental principles listed
above are not in conflict; rather, they must be considered in formulating
international law's response to modem "warfare" which is clearly a very
different "war" than all previous ones.
Active self-defense (in the form of targeted killing), if properly
executed, not only enables the State to more effectively protect itself within
a legal context but also leads to minimizing the loss of innocent civilians
caught between the terrorists (who regularly violate international law by
using innocents as human shields) and the State. "[I]n time of war or armed
conflict innocents always become casualties. It is precisely because
targeted killing, when carried out correctly, minimizes such casualties that
[Vol. 36:319
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it is a preferable option to bombing or lare-scale military sweeps that do
far more harm to genuine noncombatants."
Active self-defense aimed at the terrorist contains an element of "pin-
pointing": the State will only attack those terrorists who are directly
threatening society. The fundamental advantage of active self-defense
subject to recognized restraints of fundamental international law principles
is that the State will be authorized to act against terrorists who present a real
threat prior to the threat materializing (based on sound, reliable and
corroborated intelligence information or sufficient criminal evidence) rather
than reacting to an attack that has already occurred.
The fundamental difference between the Caroline doctrine and the
theory espoused here is the extension of Caroline to non-State actors
involved not in traditional warfare but in terrorism. If properly executed (as
suggested by David), this policy would reflect the appropriate response by
international law in adjusting itself to the new dangers facing society today.
In many ways, the doctrine espoused in this paper is one of pre-emption.
That is, the State's right to act preemptively against terrorists planning to
attack. While there is much disagreement amongst legal scholars as to the
meaning (and subsequently, timing) of words such as "planning to attack,"
the doctrine of active self-defense would enable the State to undertake all
operational measures required to protect itself. The concept of how a state
implements pre-emption against a non-State actor is one that international
lawyers will have to address in the coming years as States will be
increasingly engaged in conflict against non-State actors rather than against
States.
An example of this sort of preemption took place in the 1967 Six-Day
War when Israel attacked the Egyptian air force before Egypt had fired a
single shot against Israel, but after President Nassar had closed the Straits
of Tiran and had made his intentions regarding the destruction of Israel very
clear. Another example of preemption is Israel's successful attack on the
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, though it was heavily criticized by
international lawyers. There are also examples of preemptive action in
American history aside from the current war in Iraq. The bombing of five
Libyan military targets April 1986, though justified as a response to the
December 1985 bombings in airports in Rome and Vienna and the 1986
bombing of a West Berlin nightclub, were also supposed to be "designed to
disrupt Libya's ability to carry out terrorist acts and to deter future terrorist
acts by Libya."' 4 After the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in
1998, the U.S. fired seventy-nine tomahawk missiles on the alleged terrorist
outposts of bin Laden in Sudan and Afghanistan. President Clinton mainly
13 Steven R. David, Reply to Yael Stein: If Not Combatants, Certainly Not Civilians, 17
ETHIcs & INT'L AFF. 138, 139 (2003).
14 Lucy Martinez, September 111h, Iraq, and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 72
U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 123, 140 (2003) (quoting U.N. Ambassador Vernon Walters).
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relied on traditional Article 51 self-defense in justifying the act, but did add
that the strikes "were a necessary and proportionate response to the
imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and
facilities."'1 5
It is the ultimate thesis of this paper that the policy of targeted killings
can be fully supported by international law (as active self-defense); what is
lacking is a re-working of international law to reflect this reality.
VI. Israel's Legal Arguments for Targeted Killing
The best way to understand Israel's policy is through its response to a
petition filed to the Israel Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of
Justice against the practice of targeted killings.' 6
However, before analyzing the petition, an explanation as to how
Palestinians can file petitions against the executive (in this case, the IDF) is
in order. According to a 1968 legal opinion issued by the then-Attorney
General, Meir Shamgar, Palestinians who feel aggrieved by an action of the
Executive-in reality the IDF-may seek redress by petitioning the Israel
Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. Under President
Aharon Barak, the "doors" of the High Court of Justice have been
significantly opened in that a petition claiming that a Palestinian has been
or will be aggrieved by the executive need not be filed by the aggrieved
party. This is significant because, as a result, judicial activism or review is
an inherent part of the present armed conflict and petitions are heard and
restraining orders issued pertaining to command operational decisions in
"real time."
The concept of "standing" and its remarkable expansion over the past
few years must be examined to truly understand judicial activism in Israel.
According to the theory developed and implemented by President Barak,
there is practically no limit on what petitions can be filed to the Court and
by whom. The Supreme Court when sitting as the High Court of Justice is
in essence the only review available not only to the aggrieved but to anyone
who feels another has been aggrieved by the executive. The result is
remarkable-Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under
Israeli occupation (under the command of the military commander as Israel
has never annexed the territories) petition the Israeli Supreme Court sitting
as the High Court of Justice against actions taken by the military
commander. To demonstrate this extraordinary development-during the
month of April 2002, when the IDF was involved in intensive fighting in
Jenin, over forty petitions were filled against the IDF in the High Court of
Justice.
1Id. at 143.




Beyond the actual submitting of the petitions (either by Palestinians
residing in Jenin or on their behalf, primarily by Israeli human rights
organizations) is the fact that the High Court hears these petitions in "real-
time" and often issues decisions in "real time." The issues raised in the
petitions range from the potential demolition of a terrorist's home to alleged
firing on ambulances to the need to enable the local population to have a
normal water supply to the burial of terrorists.
The decisions are rooted in both Israeli law and international
humanitarian law. Generally, the Court writes that while military matters
are not its area of expertise, issues of humanitarian law are and intervention
will occur if the Court determines that the IDF has violated such law. This
means that when planning operations, IDF commanders must take into
account not only the possibility that petitions will be filed, but also the
possibility that a restraining order will be issued preventing the commander
from carrying out the operation (even for a short period of time). In
addition, the commander and the executive must be prepared for actual
intervention by the Court as demonstrated by the Court's decisions in
previous cases involving the interrogation of Palestinian detainees and the
location of the security fence.
In the original petition filed against the policy of targeted killings, the
Court determined that the issue was not judicable and dismissed the case.
However, when an additional petition was filed, the Court decided to hear
the parties' (the petitioner and the State) arguments. As this paper is being
written, the Court has yet to issue its ruling. While there are those who
suggest that the delay in the decision is deliberate (perhaps, according to
some, a reflection of the Courts understanding that it has crossed into truly
operational matters), the reality is that oral arguments were heard and the
parties submitted lengthy written briefs. While it is unclear when the
decision will be issued or what the Court will rule, the State's claims in its
response to the petition shed great light on its position regarding the armed
conflict in general and targeted killing in particular.
The State, in arguing that the petition should be denied, made a
number of points.
First, the present conflict between the State of Israel and Palestinian
terror organizations is defined as "Armed Conflict" (this definition had
been previously accepted and adopted by the Israel Supreme Court in a
number of decisions). On this matter, it is appropriate to note that there are
at least three different schools of thought regarding how to classify the fight
against terrorism (what has been referred to as the new form of warfare): 1)
As an international armed conflict; 2) As not an international armed
conflict; 3) As a unique form of armed conflict between a State and non-
State actor that has not been addressed in international conventions but
requires separate, distinct international law agreements.
Second, according to the law of armed conflict, terrorists taking part in
attacks against civilian or public targets are illegal combatants and not
2004]
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civilians and are therefore legitimate targets. "[A]cts of terrorism against a
country by non-state sponsored organizations or individuals need to be
considered more than just criminal acts. Instead, they should be considered
acts of war against the victim nation., 17 In State of Israel v. Marwan
Barghouti, the Court ruled that "terrorists who attack civilians are not
'lawful combatants' entitled to POW status in light of their unlawful
activities . . . unlawful combatants who attack civilians are not entitled to
this status."' 8
Third, the principle of proportionality must be respected when
implementing targeted killing. Fourth, targeted killing is used only when
the targeted terrorist cannot be arrested using reasonable means, which is in
accordance with international principles requiring exhaustion of all
reasonable alternatives. Fifth, the State cited the following:
[Il]Legal scholars who have examined thejus ad bellum dimensions of the
terrorism question would appear to agree on at least four basic principles.
Virtually all recognize that (1) if it has suffered an armed attack by
terrorist actors, a state is entitled to defend itself forcibly; (2) a victim
state's forcible self-defense measures should be timely; (3) a victim
state's forcible self-defense measures should be proportionate; and (4) a
victim state's forcible self-defense measures should be discriminate and
taken against targets responsible in some way for the armed attack. 19
VIl. Who are Legitimate Targets?
One of the critical questions that must be answered is whether suicide
bombers and those involved in terrorist infrastructure are legitimate targets.
If the answer is yes, then we must examine how they can be fought, given
that they are not soldiers in the traditional sense of the word. In the present
conflict, terrorists who take a direct role are viewed as combatants, albeit
illegal combatants not entitled inter alia to POW status, but indeed
legitimate targets. Furthermore, the legitimate target is not limited to the
potential suicide bomber who, according to corroborated and reliable
intelligence is "on his way" to carrying out a suicide bombing. Rather, the
legitimate target is identified as a Palestinian that plays a significant role in
the suicide bomber infrastructure; that is, "doers" and "senders" alike.
Having said that, tragic mistakes do occur and innocent women and
children have died during the course of a targeted killing. In all fairness,
17 Frank A. Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing Doctrines in the
Emerging War on Terrorism, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2002).
18 Cr.C. (T.A.) 092134/02, State of Israel v. Marwan Barghouti, (2002) available at
http://www.mfa.gov. il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2002/12/State%20o/2Olsrael%2Ovs
%2OMarwan%2OBarghouti- %2ORuling%2Oby%2OJud.
19 Robert J. Beck and Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International Law and
Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L. J. 153, 213 (1994).
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there are two explanations for this occurrence: 1) Wanted terrorists are
more than aware of their status and calculate (sometimes mistakenly so)
that the IDF will not target them when they deliberately surround
themselves with women and children (one should add in clear violation of
international law forbidding "human shielding"); 2) Operational mistakes,
while highly regrettable, are a reality of armed conflict. While Kofi Annan
has recently been quoted as remarking that the loss of one innocent life
makes any response to terrorism disproportionate, this statement is not
consistent with the laws of armed conflict, which allow for collateral
damage, or unintended harm, that is proportionate to the harm prevented.
Moreover, a terrorist should not be granted immunity simply because he
can surround himself with non-terrorists (human shielding).
The criticism of targeted killing is primarily based on the premise that
it constitutes either extra-judicial killing or assassination. It should be
added that targeted killings have been carried out by various governments
including the U.S. and the UK. The United States implemented targeted
killing both in response to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, despite the fact that
one of its targets was evidently a United States citizen,20 and most recently
the Islamic cleric who has sanctioned the beheadings in Iraq was reported to
have been the target of a targeted killing. While it is true that the targeted
individual is not afforded a hearing or granted the right to appeal the
decision to target him (to date women have not been targeted), he is not an
innocent civilian according to the Geneva Conventions. Rather, the
individual is an illegal combatant who has either participated in terror
attacks or ordered them to be carried out.
Extra-judicial killing, according to Amnesty International, is an
unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by order of a government or with
its acquiescence reflecting a policy to eliminate individuals even though
arrest is an option.21 Unlike extra-judicial killing, the IDF resorts to
targeted killing only when arrest is not an option. Furthermore, targeted
killing is neither punishment nor reprisal (which is illegal under
international law) for an act committed. Its primary objective is the
prevention of a terrorist act intended to kill innocent Israeli civilians and
therefore does not fall under the definition of extra-judicial killings. Extra-
judicial killing reflects a governments policy to kill the enemies of the State
not for operational or self-defense purposes, but as a means to punish
opponents of the State. In examining instances of extra-judicial killings the
overwhelming trend is that the victims are domestic political opponents by
whom regimes feel threatened. Rather than arresting them, regimes prefer
to eliminate them.
20 Biggio, supra note 17, at 2 & 14.
21 J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted Killings" Under
International Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1069, 1073 (2001-2002).
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It is critical to distinguish the concepts of targeted and extra-judicial
killing. Targeted killing occurs when arrest of the individual poses an
extraordinary operational risk and extra-judicial killing occurs when the
incapacitation of political opponents through arrest is clearly operationally
possible. Furthermore, extra-judicial killings are domestic in orientation,
and while they violate civil rights, they are not part of counter-terrorism,
where the State must take all measures to protect itself against terrorists
whose modus vivendi is killing and not political dissent. Targeted killing is
a form of preemption and is not punitive in its purpose. Thus, the
connotations of extra-judicial killing are inappropriate in the context of
targeted killing.
Targeted killing is also not an assassination. An assassination is the
killing of a political leader or a statesman and, according to international
law, involves treachery or perfidy.22 Terrorists are not political leaders or
statesmen and should never be considered as such. The difference between
a terrorist and a political leader is important to targeted killing. For
example, Arafat, though he supports terrorism, would not be an appropriate
object of a targeted killing because of his current status.
The responsibility of a State is to protect the public and only if all
other measures have failed, should a targeted killing be ordered. It is
important to understand that the "rules of the game" are clear (though they
may well be harsh) and that ultimately combatants-even if they are illegal
combatants not part of a regular armed force-die on the "battlefield."
VIII International Law
Traditional or conventional international law based on the assumption
that war is an armed conflict between two States is obviously inapplicable
to what has been deemed a new form of armed conflict.23 This new form of
armed conflict involves States and non-State actors, sometimes supported
by States but not necessarily so. It would be illogical to expect the victim
State not to respond. In light of the fact that a response is to be reasonably
expected, if not demanded (terrorists themselves expect a response as
shown by their seeking shelter in an area distant from where they generally
reside), the question becomes "against whom is the State to act" (how
broadly is the terrorist network to be expanded?) and in what fashion?
This naturally concerns the important principle of proportionality.
Targeted killing cannot be implemented against a Palestinian whose
involvement in terrorism is minor and whose actions do not endanger
22 Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law ofArmed Conflict, 43 MERCER L. REv. 615,
629-631 (1991-1992).
23 Liam G.B. Murphy, A Proposal on International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 2
TouRo J. TRANSNAT'L L., 67, 70-75 (1991).
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public safety. Targeted killing can only be implemented against those
terrorists who either directly or indirectly participate in terrorism in a
fashion that is equivalent to involvement in armed conflict. The IDF has no
intention (implicit or explicit) of using this "ultimate" weapon at will and
with impunity. It is more appropriate to consider targeted killing as a
"weapon of last resort" to be implemented, as previously mentioned, only
when all other reasonable alternatives have been ruled out as operationally
unfeasible and the terrorist in question presents a significant enough threat
that the State has determined that there is no other option.
The international law principle of military necessity is also relevant to
an analysis of targeted killing; that is, that the terrorist targeted presents a
serious threat to the public order. It is important to add as a caveat that
terrorism does not threaten the existence of a State. Neither a particular
attack undertaken by a terrorist nor a series of attacks will bring about the
destruction of a State. As horrible as 9/11 was, the government of the U.S.
was never at risk of collapsing. As horrific as the attacks Israel has
suffered, the continued existence of the State has never been an issue. The
bombing in Madrid, while clearly contributing to the defeat of the ruling
Spanish government, did not and could not endanger the very existence of
Spain. Such is the case with terrorist attacks throughout the world over the
years. Nevertheless, terrorism does exact significant social, economic and
political costs to which the State must respond. The issue is therefore to
whom and how the State responds. The terrorists involved in suicide
bombings undoubtedly present the most serious disturbance to public order
(economy, daily life, public safety). Therefore, once these individuals are
defined as legitimate targets and there are no alternatives, the military
necessity test, which requires a need to protect or ensure public order, is
clearly met.
It is important to remember that, in terms of the international law
principle of distinction, terrorists who either are actually attacking civilians
or are sending others to commit horrific attacks are not civilians according
to international law in the traditional context. Rather, they are full-fledged
combatants minus any insignia, a recognized chain of command and the
carrying weapons openly.24 In addition, unlike soldiers who, as part of a
regular army, are obligated to honor international law conventions
regulating the conduct of war, the terrorist is not bound by such agreements.
If the terrorist believes that he is not obligated to honor any set of
rules (and conducts himself accordingly), then the State must indeed be able
to target those that are threatening it. Provided, of course, as has been
discussed, that no alternatives exist and that all issues of proportionality,
military necessity and collateral damage have been thoroughly scrutinized
in order to minimize the harm to innocent civilians and to ensure that this
24 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
4. (A)(2), 6 U.S.T. 3316.
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measure is only implemented in those cases when the target presents a
genuine threat.
If the State were to not respond-in-kind it would, in essence, be
granting terrorists a form of immunity-you can attack us but we cannot or
will not attack you. It is important to understand that terrorism is clearly a
form of warfare--the questions that stand before us are how do we define
this war, who are we fighting, and how do we fight them.
While there has been much written regarding asymmetrical warfare
which claims that the State "holds the decided advantage," the reality is
more similar to what the President of the Israel Supreme Court, Aharon
Barak has written time and time again: that the State combats terrorism
"with one hand tied behind its back." This is so because States (at least,
modem liberal democracies) combat terrorism while maintaining
democratic principles and standards, thereby raising the question in whose
favor does asymmetry really work if terrorists do not feel bound by the
law?
L. Policy Concerns
While Israel's policy of targeted killings has been highly criticized, I
shall address two commentaries in particular. Professor Michael Scharf,
my friend and colleague, argued that while Israel can plausibly argue that
its acts are permissible, it "may still be misguided, creating new legions of
foes rather than diminishing them." Professor Scharf's criticism of what he
calls "assassination" (as argued above a term that I reject) is based on four
arguments: 1) instances of collateral damage; 2) instances of mistaken
identity; 3) "cascading threats to the world order"; and 4) strengthening
enemy morale via martyrdom. Professor Scharf does state that the war on
terrorism is a "gray area in international law" and quotes the U.S. National
Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, "'that it is very important that this new
kind of war be fought on different battlefields."' Against the policy of
targeted killings, Professor Scharf argues that other courses of action are
possible such as the "criminal approach of apprehending terrorists for trial"
(referring to the Pan Am 103 case).25 With regard to the possibility of
arresting Palestinian terrorists, I refer back to the section in which I discuss
the international law principle of alternatives.
With respect to the four criticisms outlined above, while instances of
unfortunate collateral damage have occurred and there is a valid argument
that the implementation of targeted killing serves to increase the number of
Israel's enemies, Israel has balanced its options and concluded that the
battle (in particular) against suicide bombers requires measures consistent
with what the NSA describes as a "different battlefield." It would appear
that from Professor Scharf's perspective, targeted killing while legally
justifiable is a poor policy choice.
25 See Scharf, supra note 2.
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To examine counter-terrorism is not only to argue the law (particularly
in an area which is considered "gray" by most international law experts),
but also to consider the policy aspects involved in the decision-making
process. Accordingly, what needs to be addressed is the policy in the
context of active self-defense as defined earlier in this paper.
From my previous detailed discussion regarding self-defense, it is
apparent that Israel practices what I term "active self-defense"; that is
taking the fight to the Palestinian suicide bomber infrastructure. While
Professor Scharf's arguments have undoubtedly been considered and
weighed by the State, the response has been a resounding "we shall
continue." Having said that, it behooves us to note that the policy is not
implemented blindly, but on a proportional basis in harmony with
international legal principles.
The question, in the context of policy considerations, is how effective
is targeted killing. A thought-provoking analysis regarding the
effectiveness of suicide bombers has been written by Professor Edward
Kaplan of Yale University. 26 In this detailed, empirically-based study,
Professor Kaplan found strong statistical evidence that hits (defined as
targeted killings) are associated with an increase in suicide bombing
attempts.27 This study would seem to support Professor Scharf's fourth
point regarding the strengthening of terrorist morale. However, though
there may be an increase in suicide bombing attempts, this increase may be
of little significance considering the fact that targeted killing has succeeded
in removing the most effective terrorists. Currently, Palestinian terrorists
are simply not as effective as evidenced by the relative lack of success of
many recent attempted suicide bombings and the long lulls between attacks.
Moreover, targeted killing has forced terrorists to be constantly on the run.
Therefore, the long-term effects of targeted killing may be more promising
than Professor Kaplan's numbers imply.
X Conclusion
On the eve of the summit between Prime Minister Sharon and newly
elected Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas in February 2005,
the Government of Israel made the decision to freeze the practice of
targeted killings. According to reports, the decision was in response to a
request by Abbas to allow him to demonstrate to the Hammas and Jihad
Islamic terrorist organizations that a renewed peace process has concrete
benefits. While Israel has clearly stated that the policy will be reinstated
should the Palestinian Authority prove itself unwilling or unable to curtail
26 Edward H. Kaplan, "hat Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a
Terror Stock Model, 28 STUDIES IN CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 225 (forthcoming May/June
2005).27 Id. at 230.
2004]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Palestinian terrorism, the decision nevertheless reflects a desire to open a
"window of opportunity" in the post-Arafat era.
According to reports both in the Israeli and foreign media the
cumulative effect of Israel's prior targeted killing policy, is significant.
Terrorists have been forced to live a constant "life on the run" which, even
for the most committed and determined terrorists, is difficult. The policy
contributed to a sowing of distrust and confusion amongst terrorist
organizations regarding the identity of informants without whom the policy
could not be implemented. Targeted killing eliminated a significant
number of key operatives, thereby disrupting the terrorist organizations, and
it seemingly discouraged potential terrorists from taking part in the suicide
bomber infrastructure.
The IDF clearly believes, as a matter of policy, that targeted killing is
indeed an effective counter-terrorism measure in combating suicide-
bombers; this in spite of the current freeze on the policy. In fact, the use of
targeted killing as a counter-terrorism measure can be justified by the
principles upon which international law regarding self-defense is based-
military necessity, proportionality, collateral damage and the exhaustion of
reasonable alternatives.
Unfortunately, international law in its current codified state is ill-
equipped to deal with today's terrorists. The International Court of Justice,
in its recent advisory opinion on the legality of Israel's security fence, went
as far as saying that Article 51 does not apply to a State's right to defend
itself against terrorists on its occupied territory.
If Article 51 is inapplicable to a situation where a State wishes to
defend itself against non-State actors, what should guide a State in its
response to terrorism? The answer is the fundamental principles behind the
laws of war regarding military necessity, proportionality, collateral damage
and alternatives. With these principles as a compass, it is time for a new
direction in international law that allows States to effectively defend
themselves against non-State actors. Just as the Geneva Conventions were
formed out of what was learned from the experience of World War II,
international laws explicitly providing for active self-defense should be
formed out of what has been learned from Israel's struggle with terrorism.
Israel's experience instructs us that targeted killing is a legitimate and
effective form of active self-defense that has helped Israel protect its
people. Protecting citizens is the ultimate duty of every State. Preventing
terrorists from achieving their aims enables a State to fulfill this ultimate
duty. The Government's recent decision to freeze the policy must be
understood in a political context and not impacting either on the legality of
the policy, nor the fact that ultimately States will indeed adopt policy that
best protect its citizenry.
[Vol. 36:319
